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Abstract 
When comparisons in terms of industrial policy lessons to be learned have taken 
place, it has tended to be solely vis-a-vis the ‘development state’ East Asian 
experience. This paper broadens the analysis and considers lessons which 
                                      
1 From a poem by William Blake (1757–1827). 
 African countries can learn fro other so-called ‘tiger’ economies including 
Ireland and the East and South Asian countries. The Irish model is relevant not 
least because of its emphasis on corporatism rather than simply relying on state 
direction in the operation of industrial policy.  The Irish model is also more 
democratic in some senses and has protected workers’ rights during the 
development process. Overall we suggest that some immediate actions are 
needed, notably with regard to the financial system in small African economies.  
Without such changes, a poorly functioning financial system will continue to 
keep investment at low levels.  In relation to the small size of the African 
economies, the paper recommends regional integration and sufficient overseas 
development assistance (ODA) for infrastructural development. 
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‘… capitalism is not a system given to stasis. What works in one period is 
unlikely to work in the next; and even when it “works”, its distribution of costs 
and benefits is never socially equal. So when deciding which tiger to ride, it is 
worth remembering that the choice is only between tigers, and that if a safe ride 
is what you want, you would do well not to ride tigers at all.’    
     (Coates 2007, 193) 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The African economies, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) stand 
today at an important crossroads. During the 1980s, for the average African 
country, GDP per capita fell at a rate of 0.5 percent per annum; in the 1990s it 
rose slightly at a rate of 0.3 percent per annum (see Table 1). However, in the 
last four years, the average growth rate of this variable has been a respectable 3 
percent per annum. In 2007, GDP growth rate in Africa was estimated to be 6 
percent per annum, one of the highest rates recorded during any year over the 
last quarter century. Apart from indicating the recent recovery in African 
economic growth, the table also highlights the poor long term performance of 
the African economies relative to other developing countries. Over the entire 26 
year period, 1981-2007, for which the data are presented in the table, per capita 
GDP in African countries rose only by 16 per cent. compared with more than a 
100 per cent. rise for all developing countries. For the East and South Asian 
economies, the growth in GDP per capita has been spectacular, a rise of well 
over 300 per cent. 
 
 
Table 1: Per capita GDP growth by region and economic grouping, 1981-2007 (percent) 
     Average annual  Overall 
     Growth   growth 
    1981- 1990-   2003-    1981- 
    1989    2002     2007              2007 
 
World    1.4 1.2 2.3   41.4 
Developed economies 2.5 1.8 2.08    67.5 
Economies in transition 1.9 -4.0 7.3   -25.8 
Developing economies 1.7 3.0 5.0              112.5 
Of which: 
 Africa   -0.5 0.3 3.0   16.4 
 America  -0.3 1.1 3.5   22.7 
 West Asia  -1.7 1.1 4.1   16.0 
 East and South Asia 5.1 5.3 6.3               317.5 
 
 
Source:  UNCTAD (2007). 
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It is very much a moot point whether this recent reversal of fortunes for the 
African countries has been due to the late success of structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) of the World Bank and the IMF, as is implicitly claimed by 
the two Bretton Woods institutions [World Bank (2007), IMF (2008)]. These 
programmes, which have been the dominant influences on Sub Saharan African 
economies during much of 1980s and all of 1990s, have embodied the 
Washington Consensus and its aftermath. According to independent economists 
[UNCTAD (2005), and (2007), ILO (2007), Mickenley (2005) and Lall (2005)], 
although many countries implemented these programmes, there has not been 
much success in enhancing their economic growth on a sustained basis. Indeed 
Thandika Mkandawire (2005), a leading scholar of African economies argues 
persuasively that the SAPs were in fact counterproductive and often led to the 
wrong kind of structural change which would hinder rather than help economic 
development. 
 
The most plausible reason for the fast growth of African economies in the last 
four years would appear to be the huge increase in international commodity 
prices. Information provided by UNCTAD (2007) reveals how the prices of 
various commodities have changed over this period: 
 
World Primary Commodity Prices, 2002-2006  
(percentage change) 
Commodity group 2002-2006 
Food and Tropical Beverages 48.4 
Agricultural raw materials 62.3 
Minerals,ores and metals 219.9 
Crude petroleum 157.6 
 
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat calculations, based on UNCTAD Commodity Price Bulletin, 
various issues, and UNSD, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues.  Adapted from 
UNCTAD (2007). 
 
The increased value of SSA exports as a result of the commodity price rise 
helped to relax the balance of payments constraint which in turn led to faster 
growth. The central issue is whether or not the African countries can translate 
this recent improved performance into sustained, fast, long term economic 
growth. Here the economic history of these countries in the last half century 
does not provide much ground for optimism. The good record of African 
economic growth between 1950 and 1973 when these economies expanded at a 
rate of nearly 5 per cent. per annum could not subsequently be sustained. 
Similarly, during the 1990s a number of countries were successively selected as 
the ‘African success stories’ by the Bretton Woods institutions, none of which 
could actually maintain fast growth for more than 2-3 years (Mkandawire, 
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2005). Such economic history invites scepticism about the ability of African 
countries to convert their recent favourable changes in the terms of trade into 
lasting progress. The case of the sceptics is straightforward. Apart from all the 
other handicaps, the African countries have been further debilitated by two 
decades of stagnation or worse; and are therefore unlikely to achieve fast long 
term growth. 
 
There are however important counter arguments which are equally an essential 
part of the story. The African countries are today much better equipped for 
initiating and sustaining fast growth, with a far greater endowment of human 
and material resources than they were 25 years ago. 
 
 The educational level of Africa’s citizens is much higher today than it was in 
the early 1970s. This is particularly notable at the tertiary level. There were 
for example only 7 university graduates in Tanzania in 1964 at the time of 
the country’s independence from British colonial rule. Today, after 
independence there are literally thousands, as a result of the establishment of 
the University of Dar-e-Salam, a splendid institution of higher education.  
 There is a network of science and research institutions, engineering colleges, 
throughout the continent. A number of business schools have also been 
established and there is close collaboration between the African and the best 
business schools in the US and the UK (Pfeffermann, 2008). 
 There are signs of an emerging middle class in the African countries. There 
is evidence also of the evolution of entrepreneurship in these countries 
(ibid.). 
 Moreover, as The Economist (2008) notes, ‘an unexpected and overlooked 
continent may benefit from its very isolation’ (p.33).  It suggests by way of 
illustration that African banks are normally regarded as being very 
conservative and excessively regulated.  ‘Now, however’ observes The 
Economist (2008), ‘this very de-linkage from the Western financial system 
has turned out to Africa’s advantage.  It’s banks have almost no exposure to 
the sub-prime market causing such havoc elsewhere…’ (p.33). 
 
With the above background, this paper considers the question of industrial 
policy for African countries and what lessons they can draw from the 
experience of other countries. As latecomers to industrialization, the African 
countries are well placed to carry out such an exercise.  Economic history of the 
last half century indicates that whereas industrial policy has been highly 
successful in some countries, it has been equally unsuccessful in others.  The 
African countries would wish to draw appropriate lessons from both sets of 
countries.  There is, however, a prior question which they obviously need to 
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consider.  Should they have an industrial policy at all?  Here the experience of 
the East and South East Asian countries does indicate that industrial policy has 
played a key role in the extraordinary success of these economies in recent 
decades.1  In addition to this there is another related and powerful reason for 
African countries to examine closely the experience of Asian countries.  Many 
countries in the two regions at the time of independence from colonial rule had 
broadly similar economic structures and income levels. To illustrate, in the 
1950s around the time of the country’s independence, Malaysia’s economy was 
much like that of Ghana, based on exports of primary agricultural commodities, 
rubber in the case of Malayasia and cocoa in relation to Ghana. Both countries 
shared the common legacy of British colonial rule.  However, today, the 
Malayasian per capita income is nearly 5000 USD at current exchange rates and 
10,000USD at PPP rates, while the Ghanian per capita income has risen very 
little over the same period. It is legitimate to ask how can one account for such 
a difference in the evolution of the two economies? Was it, for example, simply 
due to the fact that the Ghanian economy was subject to greater economic 
shocks than Malaysia’s? There is little empirical support for this hypothesis. 
Moreover, a large number of other East and South Asian countries also did very 
well using industrial policy and outperformed most African countries. For these 
reasons comparisons of African countries with East and South Asian countries 
are commonly made and are useful.  However, in this paper we briefly consider 
the experience of East Asian countries with industrial policy, but give detailed  
attention to Ireland as a comparator and present the reasons for doing so.  
 
The next section briefly explains in general terms why Ireland is an interesting 
comparison for African countries and why lessons from the Irish experience 
will be useful. Sections 3 to 8 will discuss in much greater detail the role of 
industrial policy in a broad sense as well as other important factors in the 
development of the Irish economy, together with the lessons for African 
countries. Section 9 re-examines the case of East Asian countries as role models 
for economic development for African countries. Section 10 concludes.  Close 
attention to the Irish case does not of course imply that other countries’ 
experiences are less important or less relevant, but we believe that Ireland’s 
experience with industrial policy does have useful and significant implications 
for Africa.  Nevertheless, for African countries, at a practical policy level, we 
would like to endorse the caution from Professor Karl Aginger, one of the 
leading industrial policy economists in Europe.  Aginger (2007) notes that: 
‘industrial policy is one of the most controversial policy fields.  Its scope, 
instruments and rationale vary across countries, changing over time; intentions 
and outcomes often differ’ (p. 143). 
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2. Why is Ireland an Interesting Comparison? 
When Ireland joined the then ‘Common Market’ in 1973, the economy was in 
many senses a small, poor, peripheral and agriculturally dominated economy 
with an overdependence on links to its former colonial master, the UK. Trade 
was limited given ongoing protectionism (the European Union (EU) in 
particular had yet to fully open up). In under three decades, however, the Irish 
economy has transformed itself from being one of the four cohesion countries 
of the EU to being considered an advanced high-tech enclave of the EU. 
 
There are also other reasons for using the Irish example: 
 
 Ireland, like most African countries is a small economy. It has the 
geographical size of Sierra Leone as well as a similar population. Given its 
small size, clearly the membership of the EU has played a major role in the 
evolution of the Irish success story. Apart from providing a far bigger 
market for Irish products so as to be able to reap the economies of scale, EU 
has also provided Ireland with very large direct assistance for the 
development of its infrastructure. What could take the place of EU even in a 
limited sense in the present context of small African countries? This issue 
will be taken up further below. 
 Although Ireland is far from being a laissez-faire economy it is by no means 
as ‘dirigiste’ as the East and the South Asian countries. It is more corporatist 
than the East Asian countries. The unions play a major role in the 
determination of wages and prices. Compared with the East Asian model it 
is therefore more likely to be directly relevant to the African countries. The 
East and South Asian pattern of development is heavily dependant on the 
outstanding qualities of the civil service. Such qualities are not simply 
inherited but are developed alongside the expansion of the economy (see 
Chang, 2006). Nevertheless, the corporatist model makes comparatively less 
demands on administrative capacity. 
 It is arguable that the African countries would have more to learn from the 
experience of the operation of industrial policies in Ireland than in the East 
and South Asian countries. The Irish industrial policy did not involve 
measures of coercion in the allocation of resources in the way it did in the 
case of East Asian countries during the prime of their industrial policy, for 
example, Japan between 1950 to 1973, and Korea between 1970 to 19902. It 
will be recalled that in Japan during this period the government used the 
allocation of foreign exchange in coercive ways as a principal weapon to 
meet government’s targets for specific firms and industries. Similarly in 
Korea during its main industrial policy period, there is evidence of coercion 
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in the expansion and upgrading of country’s exports by the large 
conglomerates which the government itself had created (see Amsden 
(1989,1994), Amsden and Singh (1994), Singh (1995,1998), Chang (2006)). 
 It should not be forgotten that during the operation of industrial policy in a 
number of East Asian countries, industrial ‘peace’ was ensured through the 
suppression of trade union rights. Some would argue that this alone makes 
the Irish example more suitable as a role model for African countries. 
 
The following sections examine in more detail the operation of industrial and 
developmental policies in Ireland and their relevance for African countries.    
 
3. SMEs in Ireland and in African Countries 
The relative similarity in economic experiences between the Irish case in the 
(not too distant) past and that of the small African states today warrants 
research to provide insights as to whether Ireland can regarded as a worthwhile 
case study, especially around the development of small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) given their importance in both Ireland and small African 
states. Of relevance here, some characteristics of Irish SMEs can be noted: 
 
1. Irish SMEs were focussed primarily upon the home market. Indeed, export 
oriented SMEs were an uncommon occurrence in the Ireland of the 1970s.  
2. Ireland’s small manufacturing firms in the past were mostly found in 
traditional industries such as  food;  beverages and tobacco; textiles and 
wood products.  These industries were characterised by low productivity, 
skills and research and development (R&D).    
3. Small firms in Ireland were then faced with similar barriers as small firms in 
Africa today (albeit on a different scale), namely: financial barriers 
(particularly at the business start-up stage);
 
and poor macroeconomic 
conditions as well as a poor business environment.   
 
On the latter point, several studies on the barriers encountered by small firms in 
Ireland have pointed to access to finance as being the single most critical issue 
(Forfás 1994; Goodbody Economic Consultants 2002; Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor 2001).  Very recent work on the Irish case shows that small businesses 
continue to experience difficulties in obtaining appropriate levels of finance for 
start-up and growth (Small Business Forum, 2006).  This finding has been 
reiterated in recent work with regard to small firms in Africa (see below).  
 
Until recently, there has also been no well–defined, structured or focussed  
policy for support of SMEs in Ireland. As we shall see below, industrial policy 
in Ireland has mostly been geared towards FDI and it could reasonably be 
argued that this has been at the expense of indigenous companies.  This has 
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some similarities to Africa, where an adverse business environment (with little 
support from government agencies, the regulatory offices and the managers of 
state enterprises) is an additional impediment for small firms.   
 
Despite these apparent similarities, one key aspect missing in the African case 
is the benefit of European integration in the form of the single market. When 
Ireland joined the Common Market, there were a lacuna of developed common 
policies outside the Common Agricultural Policy (which at the time absorbed 
three quarters of the EC budget). Over time, though, there have been two major 
ways in which EU economic integration has brought substantial opportunities 
for small firms: (i) through the Acquis Communautaire and (ii) through the 
benefits emanating from structural funding, particularly in the sphere of 
infrastructural development. The latter has brought significant benefit to 
Ireland.  Beyond the costs associated with the Acquis, it can generate many 
advantages to small firms in the medium to long run.  These firms will be able 
to benefit from the entire (completed) internal market of about 450 million 
consumers.   The Single Market and deregulation in the EU will also ameliorate 
cross border trade by small firms engaging in flexible specialisation. The Single 
Market can also be helpful in attracting market-seeking FDI, an element which 
is very much missing from the African case. 
 
From its post Second World War beginnings in the European coal and steel 
community, the EU has evolved into an integrated single market of 450 million 
people. Many of its member states have also adopted a common currency and a 
common monetary policy together with many other measures of deep political 
integration. Such far reaching integration is clearly beyond the capacities of 
SSA countries. However, there are substantial benefits, economic as well as 
political, even from the limited regional integration which some countries have 
attempted. There are also a few reasonably well functioning examples of 
integration in African countries, notably in Southern Africa. The emphasis in 
the more successful of these late integration projects has been less on trade 
integration but more on integration of transport as well as in other spheres of 
infrastructure. Over time these countries may be able to cooperate on monetary 
matters as well as on trade and investment. The possibilities of African 
economies to be able to benefit from the kind of assistance which Ireland 
received from the EU may not appear to be a practical proposition for African 
countries.  Yet it may not be entirely fanciful.  Who is to say that to 
acknowledge the contribution of Afro-Americans to building up modern United 
States, let alone to right the historic wrongs, a President Obama may not launch 
the equivalent of a Marshall Plan for African countries?  Such a plan should 
encourage regional integration on the E.U. pattern, leading ultimately to deep 
integration.  Even if such a grand vision does not materialise, the essential point 
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is that ODA to African countries should be used to encourage regional 
integration to create a larger market for firms in participating countries as well 
as to provide funding for the development of regional infrastructure.  
 
4. Viewing Development in the Round: The need for a Holistic Approach to 
Policy 
Commonly adopted definitions of industrial policy are too narrow where the 
key focus, particularly in the past, has been on grant-aiding firms and 
intervention with respect to particular sectors, even with a more recent focus on 
policies focused directly at the promotion of R&D and innovation and/or FDI 
and SMEs.  We argue that good practice industrial policy is in fact much more 
‘holistic’ in its approach and focuses simultaneously on both demand and 
supply side factors of industrial development; on micro economics as well as 
macro economics.3   Such an approach is in line with that suggested by the 
‘Culliton Report’ (1992) in the context of Irish industrial policy. Culliton (1992) 
emphasised provision of infrastructural needs; reform of the tax system; a re-
focusing of the education and training system; increased funding for science 
and technology (coupled with greater involvement by industry in steering the 
use of these funds); and a greater emphasis on technology acquisition. In so 
doing, the report stressed that the role of the industrial promotion agencies 
should be kept under review, and the desirability of fostering clusters of related 
industries building on ‘leverage points’ of national advantage was also 
highlighted.  
 
As for indigenous industry, Culliton saw the widespread existence of grants as 
being often counterproductive (the argument being that it encourages a hand-out 
mentality). In this vein, more emphasis should be placed on: the increased use 
of equity finance as opposed to non-repayable cash grants; an emphasis on the 
need for the expansion of the indigenous sector; a reorganisation of grant 
awarding agencies into two main agencies, one of which would address the 
needs of foreign-owned industries, the other the needs of indigenous ones.  
Culliton was also at pains to stress that the Irish Department of Industry and 
Commerce was overly focused on operational matters and needed to place 
industrial policy formulation and evaluation at the centre of its activities.  We 
argue that a ‘good practice’ definition of industrial policy includes all of these 
but also needs to emphasise other factors such as well functioning labour and 
credit markets, an appropriate macro-environment, and attempts to build 
consensus over appropriate policy direction.   
 
We broadly agree with Hitchens and Birnie (1992) in their commentary on 
evaluating the Culliton report that the real challenge is to try to weigh the 
importance of the above factors with regard to the overall ‘competitiveness 
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problem’ (we would however be more inclined to see this as the industrial or 
economic development challenge). With reference to improving 
competitiveness (or in our case industrial or economic development) the authors 
correctly point out that there is little point calling for the need to improve 
competitiveness  ‘…without any satisfactory definition that can be 
operationalised’ (p. 29).  They proceed to argue that ‘this lack of identification 
of its causes and hence effective solutions is an impediment to a satisfactory 
industrial development policy’ (ibid).  Therein of course lays the challenge for 
policymakers regardless of country.   
 
Thinking back to Ireland’s less favourable times, the preface to the Culliton 
report (1992) opens its narrative with the following comment: ‘over the past six 
months we have considered industrial policy bearing in mind the 260,000 
people who are unemployed. We have concluded that there are no short term 
solutions, no quick fixes and no soft options left’ (p. 7). In addition, it notes; 
‘Ireland’s economic problems are deep-rooted and persistent. Their resolution 
will require patience, determination and a fundamental re-appraisal of our 
strengths and weaknesses’ (p. 7). 
 
Following on from this broad and holistic view of what industrial policy should 
comprise, in the Irish case we can identify a range of factors which played a 
significant part in Ireland’s recent ‘catch up’.  These include: 
1. Currency devaluations in both 1986 and 1993 which were then locked into 
the single currency; the Euro’s post-2000 depreciation in turn benefited outward 
orientated states such as Ireland;  
2. A series of corporatist social pacts from 1987 where trade unions limited 
wage increases in return for income tax cuts. These have allowed rapid growth 
without inflation rising too high and have also enabled rapid employment 
growth; 
3. A rapid expansion in labour supply, in part through net in-migration.4 More 
widely, the demographic shifts Ireland has experienced are unique within the 
EU, with an even balance between natural growth and migration (Salt 2005: 
49)5; 
4. An interventionist industrial policy which has targeted certain sectors for 
FDI but has also recognised the limitations of FDI-based growth and somewhat 
belatedly has sought to better link foreign plants with domestic firms and has 
also tried to develop indigenous capabilities and improvements in 
entrepreneurship, labour skills and research and development. 
This analysis has implications for the design of industrial and other policies in 
other small, open and peripheral economies. We suggest that whilst important 
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lessons may be learned, they may not be those picked up by mainstream 
commentators such as Sapir et al (2003).  Furthermore, it should be noted that a 
range of factors came together: some more by luck than by judgement, and that 
the Irish catch-up should have happened much earlier had it not been for 
previous policy mistakes, particularly at the macro-level (Bailey et al, 2007). 
Indeed, on the macroeconomic-side, stabilisation was an important part of 
finally ‘getting things right’ in Ireland. By the mid-1980s, the fiscal deficit in 
Ireland had grown to over 12% of GDP and the public debt ratio was 
approaching 120%.  The recognition of the need to address these imbalances led 
to both the social pacts after 1986 and a process of fiscal consolidation achieved 
by the government reducing expenditure; over the two year period 1988-1989, 
the ratio of expenditure to GDP was reduced by 9% (see Bailey et al, 2007). 
The pain of this adjustment was eased both by EU funding and an improved 
external environment with reduced interest rates and improving demand 
(Lynch, 2005).6 Of key relevance, the impact of EU structural funding 
assistance starting in 1988 should not be underestimated: one study suggests 
that the cumulative effects of funding may have been to raise the level of GDP 
by over 4 per cent (Schweiger and Wickham, 2005: 50). Another suggests at 
least approximately 0.5 of a percentage point to GNP growth during the 1990s 
(Barry et al, 2001: 549). In other words, external funding gave Ireland just 
enough room to stabilise its economy and to make investments (especially in 
infrastructure) designed to boost competitiveness; this may be relevant for 
African economies in the context of overseas development assistance.  
Similarly, in the Africa case, UNCTAD (2005; 34) notes that overseas 
development assistance (ODA) could trigger such a ‘growth process if it is 
focused on financing pro-growth public investment such as economic 
infrastructure’. 
In addition, in the Irish case, currency depreciations which took place in 1986 
and 1993 assisted Irish competitiveness; the latter in particular was a 10% 
depreciation which was then locked into Euro entry. Whilst there was a 
revaluation of the Punt before Euro entry in 1998, the depreciation of the Euro 
after its launch delivered a further 20% boost to Irish competitiveness given its 
external-orientation in trade towards non-Euro zone economies. That this did 
not feed through into higher inflation is in part due to the corporatist social 
pacts.  
Such corporatism has been a long-standing central feature of Irish economic 
policy, with the establishment of the National Economic and Social Council 
(NESC) in 1973. As noted, by the early 1980s, Ireland faced a ‘crisis’ as the 
government had embarked on deficit-financed expenditure programmes after 
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the oil price rise of the early 1980s (and indeed the early 1970s). The existing 
development strategy based on attracting FDI was also criticised for its failure 
to support domestic industry (Telesis, 1982; Culliton, 1992).  Trans-nationals 
responded to the crisis by cutting investment and repatriating profits, 
contributing to a deficit on the balance of payments amounting to around 10% 
of GNP. Meanwhile, unemployment rose to around 20% of the labour force.  
At this crisis point, the major political parties recognised that an expansionary 
fiscal policy was no longer an option for Ireland as a small open economy. A 
social consensus for change emerged.  Key to this was the proposal by the trade 
unions in 1984 for a coordinated approach involving restrictive income policies, 
or ‘partnership agreements’. Indeed, Kennedy (2001: 135) argued that without 
partnership agreements, it is unlikely that unions would have tolerated a rise in 
the profit share of national income (see below). Developing a shared view of 
what needs to be done certainly seems to have been a key element in enabling 
the Irish catch-up.7   
Between 1988 and 2005 there were six social partnership agreements between 
government, unions and employers. The original programme was the 
Programme for National Recovery (PNR) which ran from 1987 to 1990.8 The 
PNR set out a strategy to raise competitiveness with four main components, 
which have been retained and developed over time in each of the subsequent 
partnership agreements with later agreements having broader coverage 
(including chapters on greater social inclusion, equality, enterprise culture, 
small business, agriculture, public service modernisation of and a commitment 
to support partnership at the enterprise level): 
 A commitment to reduce the level of public debt and maintain the internal 
and external stability of the Irish currency. This has focused on creating low 
inflation and interest rates and a positive climate for investors. From the mid 
1990s onwards this has tied into the EU’s Maastricht Criteria and Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP). 
 Restraining wage rises in order to improve cost competitiveness. An 
incomes policy became an essential part of the ‘new development strategy’. 
Through the pacts the government has compensated for wage restraint by 
lowering income taxes, although recently this has perhaps reached the limits 
of what is achievable. 
 To boost competitiveness, the pacts have included structural reforms in 
several areas such as industrial policy and taxation. The latter was seen as 
needing reform to encourage employment creation, being seen as biased 
towards capital and property. 
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 Social justice has been seen as important and there have been improvements 
in welfare payments for the least well-off. 
 The Irish experience, then, would suggest the importance of strong 
institutional arrangements in fostering sound economic performance and 
social cohesion around development objectives.  In addition to this, as 
Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan (2006) detail, a range of other factors 
came together to enable Ireland to catch up with other European economies, 
including: 
 A modern telecommunications network: Progression towards a modern 
telecommunications network was significantly helped by the decrease in 
telecommunications costs which subsequently reduced the real costs 
associated with firm location in a peripheral economy such as Ireland.  
 Human capital accumulation: In contrast to other peripheral host countries 
for foreign investment, Ireland had a relatively skilled (and English 
speaking) labour force. Yet it is worth noting that rapid economic growth in 
Ireland has taken place without much investment in innovation. By EU and 
international standards, and in spite of its relative current wealth, Ireland still 
suffers from a low R&D to GDP ratio (and/or R&D/GNP ratio). In contrast 
with one of the key lessons advocated by mainstream commentators, modern 
economic growth in Ireland does not owe much to innovation.  
 Competition policy and deregulation: The introduction of competition policy 
and deregulation in the early 1990s was important in terms of delivering on 
cost competitiveness for firms using Ireland as an export platform (see 
Braunerhjelm et al., 2000).  
 A shift in the type of products being traded internationally: Geographical 
disadvantage may not count as heavily anymore. As Krugman outlined: 
‘…changes in both the nature of what nations trade and in how they carry 
out that trade has shifted the balance of geographical advantage in a way that 
is favourable to Ireland’ (Krugman 1997, 44).  
 
In referring to this well trodden ground regarding the Irish growth factors, we 
simply wish to highlight that there were many factors which contributed to the 
success of the Irish economy particularly from around 1994 onwards. The 
industrial policy approach adopted by the Irish government was only one 
feature in the myriad of factors which contributed to the Irish success story. 
Almost all of the factors alluded to above would have impacted to a very large 
extent on the Irish business environment at the time. We would still suggest (see 
below) that there may be potential for government intervention in the SME 
sector in small economies such as those in sub-Saharan Africa to lead to 
significant improvements in the key growth indicators of these countries.  
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5. Using Foreign Direct Investment (and involvement) Intelligently 
It is recognised that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Africa, although 
increasing, are ‘still too limited in geographical coverage and focused on 
extractive industries to have a significant effect on employment creation and 
poverty alleviation’ (UNCTAD, 2007; 1).  A key cause of this is the high 
degree of risk and poor business environment, which deters FDI. According to 
UNCTAD (2007; 46), these impediments include ‘(a) poor infrastructure, (b) 
high entry costs, (c) labour market constraints, (d) low investor protection, and 
(e) high taxes and a cumbersome tax system’.  On the tax front, UNCTAD 
(ibid) notes that a typical firm in sub-Saharan Africa pays the equivalent of 71% 
of its profits in taxes, some 15% percent higher than the second-highest rate, 
paid in Europe and Central Asia.   
 
In contrast, FDI, notably from the United States, has been a major trigger for 
economic growth in Ireland.  Indeed, relative to the size of the economy, Ireland 
has one of the highest levels of FDI inflows in the world. Whilst successive 
Irish governments have welcomed FDI (industrialization by invitation) since the 
1950s, from the early 1970s onwards the government approach shifted towards 
a greater emphasis on selectivity and careful targeting, with pharmaceutical and 
electronics especially targeted as possessing promising opportunities. These 
industries were ideal for peripheral locations in that they were characterised by 
relatively low transportation costs and high growth rates (Braunerhjelm et al, 
2000).  Furthermore, the US was targeted as the most probable market for such 
projects given the likely benefits that would accrue to US companies using 
Ireland as an export base within the EU. It is important to note that the 
promotion and assistance of particular sectors was well timed. For example, the 
extension by the Irish government of financial incentives to internationally 
traded services just as they were about to grow in importance was a particularly 
timely intervention. Later, during the 1990s, industrial clusters in such sectors 
began to develop which involved linkages, spillover and sub–supply 
relationships with SMEs (see below). There was also a demonstration effect in 
operation, whereby the positive experiences of foreign investors in Ireland 
stimulated further FDI.  If strategic targeting and a more focused approach to 
FDI was a key part of the ‘success’ of FDI, this raises the question as to what 
sectors should small African countries now be targeting? 
Whilst the high levels of FDI were largely brought about by a corporate–
friendly environment offering the lowest corporate tax rate in the EU, it should 
be noted that these tax breaks had existed for decades with limited impact on 
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economic success; indeed the corporate tax rate on manufactured exports was 
zero form 1957 to 1981, then 10% and later 12.5%. Furthermore, other 
European economies have had such rates without attracting such levels of US 
FDI – in part this may be because of the cultural links between Ireland and the 
US where many US citizens can trace their ancestry back to Ireland, a factor 
which cannot be replicated or seen as a ‘lesson’ for others.  In a similar vein, 
House and McGrath (2004) note that the emphasis on education and training 
and the favourable corporate tax environments were both already in place 
before the mid-1980s when the economy was still stagnant (ibid.). 
Of particular note was the recognition by the Irish government in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s that foreign transnationals were in effect branch plant 
operations and that the policy of heavily subsidising FDI was producing little in 
the way of wider spillovers for the economy. Because of this, policy began to 
adopt an even more selective approach to FDI, focusing more on high-tech and 
higher value added firms. Transnational firms’ motivations for FDI in Ireland 
shifted at this time, towards accessing the single market and access to skilled 
labour.   
It should be noted that problems and challenges remain and that the picture of 
FDI-induced ‘transformation’ is challenged by some.  As Honohan and Walsh 
(2002) noted: ‘the huge profits recorded by the Irish affiliates have very little to 
do with the manufacturing activities being conducted in Ireland. The low labor 
shares in value added should not be interpreted as truly implying high economic 
productivity of the labor and physical capital employed by the enterprise in 
Ireland’.   A key ‘lesson’, as we shall see below in more detail, would actually 
be that spillovers from FDI are not generated automatically and that an 
industrial policy that targets and positions FDI is vital to ensure wider spillovers 
and to benefit the domestic sector.  The case is not anti-FDI per se; rather, we 
recognise the value of high-quality FDI in assisting economic development. 
Rather, it needs to be stressed that this should not come at the expense of 
ignoring domestic firms.  In a related vein, Buckley et al (2006) argue that the 
contribution of transnationals to the Irish economy can also be overestimated by 
failing to take account of the following: the high level of imports (including 
payments for patents, royalties and other tangible inputs) and repatriated profits.  
Citing the work of Keating (2000), the authors show that ‘…sales amounted to 
€72 billion in 2004.  However, when imports of €43 billion and profit 
repatriation of €19 billion are deducted the direct contribution to GNP is only 
10 billion’ (Buckley et al 2006: 2).  
Attracting high-quality FDI and positioning it seems crucial. Here, lessons with 
FDI experiences in peripheral regions of the EU seems highly relevant in taking 
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on board elements of ‘good practice’. This includes targeting strategic sectors 
and linking FDI to cluster development, building trust with local managers in 
order to try to upgrade local plants, undertaking sector specific research on the 
strengths and weaknesses of local industry, providing aftercare support, 
targeting financial assistance at specific upgrading needs (e.g. investment in 
R&D rather than general support), and the monitoring of performance (see 
Amin and Tomaney, 1995; Bailey et al 1999).  The Irish experience of 
selectively targeting FDI seems very relevant here and raises the issue more 
generally of using selective as well as horizontal industrial policy.9   
 
The discussion of this section will be seriously incomplete without reference to 
the fact that in the practice of industrial policy in East Asia, both Japan and 
South Korea discouraged FDI rather than to seek it.  Singh (1995) noted that 
among developing countries, the Republic of Korea was second only to India in 
its low reliance on FDI inflows.  Foreign capital stocks totalled just 2.3 per cent 
of GNP in 1987 for the Republic of Korea, above the 0.5 per cent estimate for 
India, but far below the levels of 5.3 per cent for Taiwan Province of China, 17 
per cent for Hong Kong, a massive 87 per cent for Singapore, 10 per cent for 
Brazil and 14 per cent for Mexico (UN, 1993).  In the view of the World Bank 
economists, this discouragement was a self-imposed handicap, which was 
compensated for by the fact that both countries remained open to foreign 
technology through licensing and other means (East Asian Miracle, p.21).  
Singh noted that World Bank economists did not ask the question: if the 
governments of Japan and the Republic of Korea were as efficient and flexible 
in their economic policy as they themselves suggested (to account for their 
long-term, overall economic success), why did they persist with this apparently 
wrong-headed approach for so long? 
 
An alternative interpretation is that the approach was perhaps not so wrong-
headed after all.  It was ‘functional’ within the context of the overall industrial 
policies which the two countries were pursuing.  First, it would have been 
difficult for MITI or the authorities of the Republic of Korea to use 
‘administrative guidance’ to the same degree with foreign firms as they were 
able to do with domestic ones.  Secondly, as UN (1993) rightly emphasized, 
there was a link between the national ownership of large firms and their levels 
of investment in research and development.  The Republic of Korea had, in 
relative terms, by far the largest expenditure on R&D among developing 
countries: 1.9 per cent of GNP in 1988, compared with 1.2 per cent for Taiwan 
Province of China (1988), 0.9 per cent for India (1986) and Singapore (1987), 
0.5 per cent for Argentine (1988), 0.6 per cent for Mexico (1984) and 0.4 per 
cent for Brazil (1985).  Korea’s  performance in this area outstripped that of 
many developed countries- for example Belgium (1.7 per cent in 1987), 
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Denmark (1.5 per cent in 1987) and Italy (1.2 per cent in 1987).  It was, of 
course, still below that of industrial super-powers, Japan (2.8 per cent in 1987) 
and Germany (also 2.8 per cent in 1987). 
 
Thirdly, Freeman (1989) stressed another important advantage of the policy of 
mainly rejecting foreign investment as a means of technology transfer.  This, he 
argued, automatically placed on the enterprise the full responsibility for 
assimilating imported technology.  This was far more likely to lead to total 
system improvements and broader spill-overs than the ‘turn-key plant’ mode of 
import or the foreign subsidiary mode.   
 
It is important to emphasize that Japan and South Korea’s rejection of FDI did 
not mean that these countries are not interested in importing foreign technology.  
Quite the contrary.  Japan after all has been attempting to obtain technology 
from abroad for a hundred years.  The reason why it did not favour FDI as a 
source of technology was that it was inter alia comparatively much more 
expensive than licensing. The latter was a policy pursued by Japan up to the 
1980s, when under pressure from the US it began finally to dismantle such 
barriers and started to allow in FDI without requiring a Japanese joint venture 
partner (Bailey and Sugden, 2007). 
 
The above considerations may also be valid for at least some SSA countries 
who may also prefer to import technology through licensing rather than through 
the medium of FDI. 
 
6. Indigenous Firms and Domestic Entrepreneurship 
Some commentators, such as Bailey et al (2007), have argued that the Irish 
government, on recognising the limitations of solely focusing on FDI as an 
engine of growth, also sought to develop indigenous small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurship more generally. Whilst acknowledging 
the merits of this opinion, we would also suggest that the focus on indigenous 
SMEs and entrepreneurship by Irish policymakers should have come much 
earlier.  Despite the fact, as outlined by Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan 
(2006: 282), that ‘…even as far back as 1979, some 95 per cent of all 
manufacturing units could be classified as SMEs’, it is nevertheless quite 
astonishing that there was no formal focus by the Irish government on the small 
firms sector per se until 1994 with the publication of ‘The Task Force on Small 
Business Report’ (1994). This was followed a year later by the EU driven 
‘Small Business Operational Programme’ (1995). The ‘SME story’ in Ireland is 
an indigenous one as a majority of all indigenous firms in Ireland are classified 
as SMEs.   
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One could justifiably argue that the Irish government to a large degree 
overlooked the indigenous (largely SME sector) until the mid 1990s. As such, 
this represents a key policy ‘failure’ and should be avoided by small African 
states.   Admittedly, in the Irish case there were grants available to indigenous 
firms to start-up and expand - but the focus on indigenous and SME firms was 
over-shadowed by the prime focus by the Irish government on FDI. This is 
evident in comments from various reviews of industrial policy over the decades; 
most notably the ‘Telesis Group’ (1980), which highlighted an over-emphasis 
on foreign industry.  The Culliton report noted above also emphasised the need 
to expand the indigenous sector, noting that ‘the focus instead must shift 
decisively to indigenous companies. The view of… Porter and his 
colleagues…is that in Ireland the shift has been ‘too little too late’ and that there 
has not been a full commitment to the slow process of developing a broader 
base of indigenous firms’ (p. 67). However, it was not until the ‘Task Force on 
Small Business Report’ published in 1994 that the focus on the SME sector by 
Irish policy makers truly began in earnest.   
 
Some of the problems facing small firms in Ireland are similar, albeit in a much 
more intense form, in Africa, most notably the issue of access to finance. As 
UNCTAD (2007; 15) notes, this is especially the case for the small domestic 
enterprises in the informal sector that represent the vast majority of firms. 
Indeed, it is thought that firms in sub-Saharan Africa fund between one half and 
three quarters of their new investments from their informal savings. In order to 
address this, microfinance systems have emerged in recent years in order to 
rectify some of the shortcomings of the financial system in Africa. 
 
More generally, Acs et al (2007) suggest that entrepreneurs in Ireland are held 
in high esteem, and that this has been beneficial for the economy. This is 
questionable. Indeed, Culliton (1992) highlighted ‘…the negative attitude 
towards enterprise that is prevalent in this country’ (p. 22) and proceeded to 
outline ‘…a deep-rooted prejudice against failure in business.  The stigma that 
attached to a failed enterprise very often inhibits the individual from ever trying 
again’ (p. 22).  Perhaps it could be argued that such a negative attitude no 
longer exists.  However, ten years later from Culliton, Goodbody Economic 
Consultants (2002), although acknowledging an improvement, still noted that 
the ‘non-acceptance of ‘failure’, both on the part of financial institutions and the 
general public is still perceived to be an issue by Irish entrepreneurs’ (p. iv).  
They do however, admit that ‘these attitudes are somewhat at variance with 
recent international studies which indicate that the general public’s attitude 
towards entrepreneurship in Ireland is now highly favourable’ (p. iv).   
 
7. Spillovers, Linkages and Clusters 
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There was a general belief, hope and anticipation in Irish industrial policy 
circles that indigenous SMEs would ‘… grow from foreign firms through 
linkages and spillovers’ (Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006: 280).  
The  spillover argument is often used by governments to justify subsidies for 
FDI, but such spillovers are not guaranteed. It is to this issue that we now turn, 
asking how successful (where they existed) were Irish Government policy 
interventions in achieving successful linkages and spillovers between incoming 
transnationals and indigenous (largely SME) firms?  This is significant as some 
see this link as a key element of the Irish ‘success story’. For example, Pike et 
al in their well-balanced review of local and regional development (2006; 233) 
suggest that: 
 
‘the role of industrial policy… seems important, with the Irish state and 
its governance institutions proving adept at providing the kinds of 
territorial assets that attract the sorts of TNCs that will contribute to 
development. Ireland may provide an example of a somewhat ‘strategic 
coupling’ between domestic and foreign owned firms…’. 
 
The wider FDI literature tells us that, if present, positive spillovers from 
transnationals can lead to increases in the productivity of domestic firms.  This 
can happen via three main routes: (1) demonstration effects; (2) competition 
effects, and; (3) labour market effects.  As noted, spillovers are not an automatic 
occurrence but are in essence driven by the characteristics of the host economy, 
such as its degree of economic development, its ability to assimilate imported 
technology and more generally its absorptive capacity (see Blomström and 
Kokko, 1996 and Blomström et al. 2000).  In this section we briefly highlight 
the key evidence regarding the prevalence such linkages and spillovers in 
Ireland.  Most notably, despite the rhetoric of ‘FDI-led adjustment’, there is 
significant evidence to suggest that the Irish economy operates according to a 
Lewis-type dualism ‘…with little relationship / interdependence between MNEs 
and (local enterprises) and each developing according to its own pattern’ (Ugur 
and Ruane, 2004: 3). As such, each sector appears to have developed according 
to its own pattern. Such problems of ‘dualism’ remain a major problem in many 
developing economies; for example UNCTAD (2007;6) notes that in Africa, 
FDI is ‘…relatively volatile and tends to focus on extractive industries with 
very few linkages to the domestic economy’.   
 
In the Irish case, there is evidence from some sectors at least of improved 
linkages over time, such as in electronics (see Görg and Ruane, 2000; 2001), 
even if foreign (particularly large) firms have lower linkages – perhaps due to 
the necessary scale needed to supply such firms (ibid.). Other authors (e.g., 
Kearns and Ruane, 2001) suggest that the level of R&D activity in a plant is a 
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key determinant with regards to firstly, lengthening the duration over which that 
plant will stay in Ireland and secondly with respect to improving the quality of 
the employment generated in the plant. For high-technology sectors, the 
evidence of spillover effects is even more evident (Görg and Strobl, 2002; 
2003; Barry and Van Egeraat, 2008). Here, there is evidence to suggest that the 
presence of transnationals in high-technology sectors has had a ‘life-enhancing’ 
effect on indigenous plants in Ireland,  improved indigenous entry rates, and has 
improved links between manufacturers and components suppliers in sectors 
such as IT. 
 
Other contributions  (e.g. from  Heanue and Jacobson, 2003; Forfás  2004; 
Lenihan and Sugden, 2008) have also explored the issue of linkages in Ireland. 
Lenihan and Sugden (2008) argue that the National Linkages Programme 
introduced in 1985 was partly in response to criticism of an industrial policy 
approach by Irish government that relied on transnationals and was 
subsequently restructured by Enterprise Ireland with a focus surrounding the 
issue of the globalization of local supply industry.  This approach resulted in a 
move towards the building of supply networks and chains as opposed to actual 
direct local company linkages. Forfás (2004) in analyzing the impact of the 
National Linkages Programme argued that it stopped short of reaching its 
potential, while Heanue and Jacobson (2003) argued that there was some 
success up to the 1990s but thereafter the impact was insignificant.  In terms of 
more traditional sectors, Culliton (1992: 31) argued that only a small proportion 
of potential linkages between foreign and traditional firms were being realized; 
and that ‘[i]n general,…. policy to promote industrial linkages has not lived up 
to its expectations. It is only a mild exaggeration to say that most of the newer 
foreign firms operate here as essentially an industrial enclave’ (ibid.). The 
overall conclusion on the success or otherwise of linkages in Ireland is 
succinctly summed up by Ruane (2001) when she concludes that ‘it is hard to 
either totally prove or disprove’ whether linkage policies have been successful. 
 
A more detailed example can be seen in the case of the IT sector. This is of 
particular importance in the Irish case, as software firms have been regularly 
cited by commentators within and beyond Ireland as one of the most successful 
examples of FDI spillovers (Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006).  
Buckley et al (2006) outline that the majority of foreign and domestic firms in 
the software industry in Ireland are located in the same region.  Citing the work 
of Crone (2002), they outline that in excess of 70% of MNE subsidiaries and 
87% of domestic firms are located in and around the greater Dublin area.  They 
proceed to argue that such a concentration of indigenous and foreign software 
firms in one area is likely to facilitate increased technology transfer between the 
two sets of firms.  Barry (1999) argued that software is an industry where one-
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third of all indigenous software firms have been started by ex-employees of 
transnationals.  In a similar vein, in the case of the software industry in Ireland, 
evidence indicates that the vast majority of indigenous firms were founded by 
former employees of software and hardware transnationals (Buckley, 2005; 
Buckley et al., 2006).  More precisely, these authors outline that 44% of new 
venture founders were employed in software and hardware transnationals 
immediately prior to establishing their own enterprises.   
 
In explaining such trends, Buckley et al (2006) argue that a number of factors 
were likely to have contributed to the maximisation of productivity spillovers to 
the indigenous software industry in Ireland.  These include: (1) the fact that 
transnationals choosing Ireland could be described as technologically superior 
(i.e. they employed high end technologies); (2) the transnational software sector 
in Ireland is almost entirely export focused; (3) former transnational employees 
who subsequently went on to establish their own new ventures were key 
knowledge transfer agents to indigenous software firms; (4) the indigenous 
software firms demonstrated a high absorptive capacity, e.g. via a high degree 
of tertiary educated employees; (5) the clustering of indigenous and 
transnational firms; and (6) the indigenous software sector was enhanced by 
Irish government policies which focused on a reorientation of the education 
system in the 1980s with the objective of providing a pool of graduates for 
technology focused industries.  Point 5 in this list, the development of industry 
clusters, highlights a related – and to a degree a necessary precursor - to the 
maximization of FDI spillovers and linkages. Indeed, one of the key reasons for 
the promotion of cluster policy is so that firms located in particular clusters will 
engage in linkages and spillovers with each other.  
 
Accordingly, we now turn to the specific question of just how successful was 
the creation of clusters in Ireland?  A focus on creating sectoral and spatial 
clusters in Ireland really only began in earnest in the 1980s (Buckley and 
Ruane, 2006). Such efforts were focused around two key high technology 
sectors, namely, electronics and chemicals/pharmaceuticals.  More specifically, 
four segments of the electronics sector were targeted: microprocessors, 
software, computer products and printers.  In line with this strategy, some of the 
key players in these sectors, namely Intel and Microsoft, were attracted to 
establish operations in Ireland (ibid.).  With the location of such firms, and 
subsequently Hewlett Packard in printing, Ireland to all purposes had an 
‘electronics hub’ and the ‘spokes’ were soon populated by dozens of smaller 
enterprises (ibid. 1620).  Ireland could thus be said to have been a significant 
beneficiary of the formation of clusters (Krugman, 1997); with the presence of 
the above-named firms contributing to the average share of US FDI in 
electronics to Ireland increasing to 27 per cent between 1994 and 2001, 
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compared to a rate of less than 12 per cent for Irish manufacturing as a whole 
(Buckley and Ruane, 2006). The two other key sectors where industrial clusters 
were created are the chemicals and pharmaceutical sectors, with these firms 
clustering primarily in the Cork region of Ireland.  However, in contrast to 
experience in the electronics sector, where production linkages between firms 
developed, this was not the case with the chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
clusters.  Another cluster also developed in the medical devices sector.  The 
latter is concentrated in the west of Ireland, with many firms being attracted to 
locate there due to a favourable attraction policy by the Irish government 
(primarily in the form of high subsidy inducements).  This particular cluster is 
however less concentrated (when compared to the other clusters in Ireland) and 
the average size of business operating in the medical device cluster is also 
relatively small (Buckley and Ruane, 2006).   
 
In general, the empirical evidence on the impact of clusters in Ireland is, 
however, limited, with what evidence there is suggesting that there has been 
relatively little sectoral clustering between transnationals and local firms, at 
least in low-tech sectors and manufacturing overall (Gleeson et al, 2005; 
Buckley and Ruane (2006). As seen from the above discussion, there does 
however, appear to have been some clustering between transnationals and local 
firms in some high-tech sectors. As such, in concluding this brief discussion of 
the success or otherwise of cluster policy in Ireland (as part of the look at 
industrial policy more broadly), it seems that the prevailing evidence (where it 
exists) is mixed and inconclusive-and warrants further examination. The Irish 
government (Report of the Small Business Forum, 2006) has recognised, 
however, that as more low-value-added activities migrate to lower-cost 
countries, a greater proportion of GNP will have to be produced by indigenous 
firms (predominantly SMEs). Other reports commissioned by the Irish 
government (e.g. a study by Goodbody Economic Consultants, 2002) have also 
focused on the importance of entrepreneurship and more specifically on 
eliminating the barriers to entrepreneurship in Ireland.  Whilst welcoming this 
focus, we would argue that this should have come much earlier in Ireland’s 
development, and we see this as an important ‘lesson’ for other states as they 
look for lessons to be learned in terms of industrial policy trajectory.  
 
This review only serves to reiterate our point that a holistic industrial policy 
needs to account for the limitations and fragilities of FDI-led growth and hence 
also promote measures to grow domestic capacity, and to deliver a variety of 
growth ‘drivers’ for the economy.  It is fair to say that the limitations of FDI-led 
growth have been increasingly (if belatedly) recognised, and Ireland is now 
recognised to be vulnerable due to the downturn in the US economy, given its 
overwhelming reliance on US-based FDI. As such, at this critical period, 
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Ireland faces increasing competition for FDI from emerging economies, and 
Ireland is no longer a cheap country in which to do business, due to rises in 
wages and raw material costs. Whilst this has been realised, a more holistic 
approach to policy development at the outset could have avoided some of the 
problems we identified above, thereby enhancing economic development, a 
point which small, peripheral economies elsewhere may wish to note. 
 
The discussion of this section and the last will again be incomplete without 
reference to the role of large indigenous firms in the development process.  In 
many countries, such firms which are large by developing countries standards 
but rather puny in international terms are the spearheads of spreading technical 
change and productivity growth.  Amsden (1989) is the leading exponent of the 
critical role of large indigenous firms in late industrialization.  What is, 
therefore, required in industrial policy for developing countries is the right 
balance between the promotion of large and small firms.  To illustrate this 
point, Indian industrial policy in the period 1950 to 1980 is an example of a 
policy which encouraged small firms at the expense of large firms in order 
primarily to safeguard employment.  Despite its good economic rationale, this 
policy is generally regarded as being a failure as it stopped the growth of large 
firms and thwarted their role in the development process. See further Joshi and 
Little (1994), (Ahluwalia (1992) and Singh (forthcoming).  
 
8. Policy Evaluation 
In view of the types of market failures that are likely to arise in the SME sector 
noted above (e.g. the finance gap), a realistic route to help improve the 
efficiency of such markets is through the services provided by industrial 
development agencies. The extent to which development agencies in Ireland 
have produced the expected effects is an issue of significant and ongoing 
debate. One key issue that emerged in discussions (particularly pertaining to the 
1990s) is that of agency duplication of services provided.
 
The Industrial 
Evaluation Unit (1999) found that around 39 per cent of firms that received 
support from more than one agency took up such support within the same time 
period. The prime lesson to be learned in this regard is that the support 
environment provided by government to firms needs to be clearly targeted and 
focused in its delivery. A clear underlying rationale for a specific type of 
intervention should be provided in all cases. 
 
One of the outcomes of EU funding in the case of Ireland is that over time there 
was increased pressure to engage in an evaluation of industrial policies 
(primarily to begin with for reasons of accountability). Indeed, guidelines from 
the European Commission (EC) as a result of Ireland being a Structural Fund 
beneficiary were definitely a key driving force behind the much greater 
23 
 
emphasis placed on evaluation in Irish policy from the early 1990s onwards.  
This is outlined by Andreosso O’ Callaghan and Lenihan (2006) in the context 
of the New EU Member States, but here we argue that the same issues are also 
pertinent to small African states. A number of possible strategies can be 
adopted in the context of industrial policy evaluation (options 1-3 are not 
mutually exclusive and a mixed approach is possible):  
 
1. Wait until pressure comes from outside to evaluate. In Ireland’s case this 
was from the EU.  In the case of the African economies, the impetus may 
come from agencies providing overseas development aid. This was the 
stance largely adopted by Ireland from around 1993 onwards;  
2. Familiarise themselves with ‘best practice’ or at least ‘good practice’ 
evaluation frameworks and methodologies adopted internationally
 
(reflecting on the key issues learned) so that they are in a position to 
know ‘how’ (deciding on the methodological approach to be adopted is 
one of the key challenges for evaluators) to evaluate when requested to 
do so by external donors or organisations ; 
3. View evaluation as a useful tool in its own right. This would involve 
adopting a proactive approach whereby evaluation would take place at 
the three stages of the industrial policy process: policy formulation (ex–
ante evaluation focusing on the market failure argument as a rationale for 
intervention and fundamental economic principles such as opportunity 
cost); policy implementation; and policy accountability (ex–post 
evaluation) (Rist 1995). Such an approach not only sees evaluation as 
something that must be undertaken due an external pressure (e.g. donor 
or funder) but rather sees evaluation as a worthwhile activity in terms of 
lessons to be learned that can subsequently be incorporated into future 
policy interventions.  There is no doubt that many would regard 
evaluation as a ‘luxury’ in African economies where resources are 
already scarce.  We would argue however, that if robust evaluations are 
carried out (which ask the right questions relating to issues such as 
deadweight, displacement10, multipliers and linkages) this may lead to 
improved future industrial policy interventions which in the long run 
could prove to be extremely cost effective and efficient.  Clearly, this is 
an area that merits further investigation.   
 
Ireland should certainly not be regarded as a role model in the context of  
industrial policy evaluation, having hovered around option 1 for most of the 
1990s, although of late, it is certainly getting nearer to option 3. This is 
highlighted by Lenihan et al (2005; 14), who argue that ‘the methodological 
rigor of Irish industrial policy evaluations has been improving in recent years’.   
It was not until some pressure came from the European Commission that Irish 
24 
 
policy makers and academics alike truly began take industrial policy evaluation 
seriously. This is somewhat difficult to comprehend given that an 
interventionist approach to industrial policy has been a feature of the industrial 
policy stance by successive governments in Ireland since the 1950s, with the 
first grant to firms actually being awarded as far back as 1952. The degree of 
subsidy intervention in the Irish case is aptly summed up by Lenihan et al 
(2005) when they show that over the period 1980-2003, in the region of €5.5 
billion was provided by the four Irish development agencies in the form of grant 
payments and equity investments.  The key point is that any policy intervention 
should bring about a level of ‘additionality’ in excess of what would have 
happened if no such intervention had taken place (i.e. explore the counter–
factual, which involves trying to assess what would most likely have happened 
if no intervention had taken place).  In this regard, Storey (2000) argues that a 
prerequisite to any evaluation is that clear objectives be specified. More 
precisely, he highlights the ‘…impossibility of conducting an evaluation in the 
absence of clearly specified objectives for the policy concerned’ (p. 177).  This 
calls for a clearly defined set of policy objectives from the outset, and to allow 
for ‘trail and error’ as an important part of policy development. As UNCTAD 
(2007; 87) notes, referring in particular to East Asian experience: 
 
‘A simple replication of the East Asian developmental State, even of 
there were such a thing, would not do.  As a matter of fact, there is no 
such thing as the East Asian model of a developmental State that could be 
recommended to Africa.  Indeed, the intrinsic differences among the 
Asian experiences underscore the importance of ‘trial and error’ as an 
important ingredient of policy formulation and implementation in 
developmental States.  This process should benefit from constant 
monitoring and the feeding of the lessons learnt from monitoring into 
new policies to overcome earlier shortcomings’.  
 
Given some of the failures (as well as successes) of ‘traditional’ Japanese 
industrial policy (see Bailey and Sugden, 2007), some may conclude that Katz 
(1998) is correct in arguing that ‘development state’ policies should be avoided.  
However, in a sense economies are always in a state of ‘development’; for us, 
the key is to adapt and tailor policies holistically to that stage of development. 
An additional challenge (as with all calls for evaluation) is who should actually 
carry out such evaluations. The follow-on question is who should evaluate the 
evaluators?  Clearly, in the face of the level of corruption and lack of resources 
to carry out some evaluations in some of the African economies, this issue is 
particularly pertinent.   
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9.   Reflections on the East Asia ‘developmental State’11 
Is there an East Asian model?  This is a prior issue in considering the relevance 
of the East Asian developmental State to African countries.  In some academic 
circles, it has become customary to deny the existence of such a model and to 
argue that if it existed at all, it was not very successful.   Yet businessmen and 
men of affairs have no hesitation in identifying the ‘Asian way of doing 
business’.  See for example Greenspan (1998).   Singh (1999) suggested that 
there would be general agreement on the following characteristics of the East 
Asian model:- 
 
1. The close relationship between the government and business where the 
government did not do anything without consulting business and vice versa. 
2. Many interventions were carried out through a system of ‘administrative 
guidance’ rather than through formal legislation. 
3. The relationship between the corporation and the financial system in 
countries like Japan and Korea was also very different from that of the US  
and the UK. The former countries followed, for example, the so-called main 
bank system which involved long-term relationships between the 
corporations and the main banks. This enabled Japanese or Korean managers 
to take a long-term view in their investment decisions. The managers were 
not constrained by the threat of hostile take-overs on stock markets as in the 
case in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
4. There were differences in the internal organisation of East Asian 
corporations compared with those of the US and the UK. The former 
involved co-operative relationships between management and labour, 
epitomised by the system of lifetime employment. This implied considerable 
imperfections in the labour market. 
5. As for competition in product markets, such competition was not regarded 
by the East Asian authorities as an unalloyed good. Unlike in countries like 
the US, economic philosophy in the east Asian countries did not accept the 
dictum that ‘the more competition the better’. The government in these 
countries were of the view that, from the perspective of promoting 
investment and technical change, the optimal degree of competition was not 
perfect or maximum competition. The governments had therefore 
purposefully managed and guided competition: it had been encouraged but 
also restricted in a number of ways. 
6. Following this basic economic philosophy outlined above, the East Asian 
government sought not ‘close’ but what might be called ‘strategic’ 
integration with the world economy, i.e. they integrated up to the point 
where it was useful for them to do so. Thus during their high-growth 
development phase, Japan (between 1950 and 1973) and Korea (1970s and 
1980s) integrated with the world economy in relation to exports but not 
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imports; with respect to science and technology but not finance and multi-
national investment (see Chakravarty and Singh (1988)).   
 
 
The above is a characterisation of the East Asian model as an ideal type. Not all 
countries, or even Japan and Korea, have followed the model exactly at all 
times in the post-war period. As far as government-business relationships are 
concerned there is a continuum with the closest relationship to be found in 
Korea, and the least close in Thailand. Malaysia and Indonesia fall in between. 
Similarly, the main bank system worked differently in Korea compared with 
Japan. Unlike Japan, where the ‘main banks’ were by and large private entities, 
in Korea for much of the period these were directly state-controlled. Only in the 
recent period have they been privatised. Nevertheless, there is considerable 
truth in the view that the Asian way of doing business and the institutional 
structures it has generated are rather different from those of countries like the 
US and the UK (Greenspan, 1998; Summers, 1998). 
 
With respect to the application of the model to African countries, as noted 
earlier, UNCTAD (2007; 87) did not regard a simple replication as being very 
useful.  However, in line with Chang (2006), it is the case that East Asian 
countries, with the exception of Hong Kong, have at different times used a wide 
range of industrial policy measures with considerable success. Pulling together 
this variety of experiences, Chang (2006) argues that the success of industrial 
policy critically depends on how it is designed and implemented, and he 
highlights five main points from East Asian experience: 
 
1. The selection of target industries need to be realistic and related both to the 
country’s technological capabilities and world market conditions. The 
success of East Asian countries ‘owe a lot to the fact that they did not 
attempt to make too big a step’ (Chang, 2006; 126). 
2. Industrial policy needs to be closely integrated with an export strategy, 
especially in small economies. For example, scale economies cannot be 
achieved without entering the export market early on. This in turn brings us 
back to the relevance of the Single Market for Ireland in providing a wider 
market. 
3. The government needs to discipline the recipients of the rents it creates 
through the use of tariffs, subsidies etc in order to compensate for the loss of 
market discipline. 
4. The implementing bureaucracy needs to be both competent and politically 
insulated. Chang stresses that East Asian countries do not have any 
particular cultural advantage which leads to good bureaucracies. This is due 
only to continuous effort.   
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5. Close interaction between the government and private sector is necessary 
without the former becoming hostage to the latter.  On this, Chang refers to 
Evans’ (1995) use of the term ‘embedded autonomy’ to reflect the needs for 
both roots in society but also its own will and power. In this vein, Bailey and 
Sugden (2006) suggest that where Japanese industrial policy started to ‘go 
wrong’ was when it was effectively captured by giant firms for their own 
benefit. Recognising and avoiding such dangers seems crucial to enable 
policy to function for a public rather than a private benefit.   
 
10. Concluding Thoughts 
As outlined in this paper, there are indeed some interesting similarities and 
lessons to be learned (both good and bad) by the smaller African economies 
from the Irish industrial policy (and other) experiences.  Key amongst these is 
the concern expressed in this paper that industrial policy should not be seen 
purely in narrow terms, that is with a sole focus on attracting FDI.  We argue 
here that there is need for a more ‘holistic’ approach to economic development 
which inter-alia focuses on the development of domestic entrepreneurship and 
indigenous firm expansion more generally as well as emphasising the 
importance of other supply side factors (e.g. infrastructure; well functioning 
labour markets).  This more all-encompassing view of industrial policy and 
economic development may, it could be argued, take a longer time to 
materialise. This is a difficult position for the African economies to be faced 
with given the extremely high levels of  poverty and deprivation witnessed in 
many of these small African economies.  We do however, argue that such a 
‘holistic’ growth trajectory could lead to a more sustainable industrial 
development path, in contrast to the current situation in Ireland whereby the 
recent down turn in the US economy has sent shock waves through the Irish 
economy given its (over)dependence on US firms.12  
 
This paper has provided some novel insights by providing a comparison 
between Ireland and the small African economies.  To our knowledge such a 
comparison has not been carried out heretofore.  As acknowledged in this paper, 
when comparisons in terms of industrial policy lessons to be learned have taken 
place, it tends to be vis-a-vis the East Asian experience (which, as seen above, 
undoubtedly also provides interesting economic development insights but with 
certain caveats). 
 
The paper suggests that a very important contribution of the Irish model is its 
emphasis on corporatism rather than simply state direction in the operation of 
industrial policy.  The Irish model is also in a sense more democratic and  has 
protected workers’ rights during the development process than the highly 
dirigisite East Asia model.  In relation to the small size of the African 
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economies, the paper recommends regional integration and sufficient ODA for 
infrastructural development. 
 
We conclude here by making the point that some immediate actions are needed 
for example with respect to the financial system in the African economies.  A 
poorly functioning financial system will continue to keep investment at low 
levels.13 It is also important to bear in mind that the various small African 
economies each face their own industrial and economic development 
challenges, therefore we do not suggest a ‘one size fits all’ approach.  As 
outlined by UNCTAD (2007), referring to East-Asian experience, the path to 
sustainable growth and development is derived from ‘a pragmatic mix of 
markets and state action, taking into account the country-specific development 
challenges’ (UNCTAD, 2007; 61). It concludes: 
 
‘The challenge for Africa (as for other developing countries), therefore, is 
not how to copy any model, but how to create ‘capitalisms’ adaptable to 
the unique opportunities and development challenges in each country…’ 
(UNCTAD, 2007; 88).   
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Notes 
 
1 Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) are two well known representative studies 
from the huge literature on this subject. 
2 These were the high growth periods for the two countries. In 1973 Japan was 
still more like a developing country than it has been since. See further Singh 
(1995). 
3 Singh (1995) comments on the inter-relationship between industrial policy and 
macro economic stability with particular reference to the experience of East 
Asian countries..  To the extent that industrial policy was effective in Japan or 
the Republic of Korea in relieving the balance of payments constraint, it will 
also have aided macroeconomic stability.  A current account balance at the 
desired growth rate can help to avoid the stop-go cycles which many economies 
experience.  This, in turn, will lower the cost of capital since for a given savings 
rate in the economy, other things being equal, the more variable and unstable 
the economic performance, the higher the interest rate.  Similarly, faster 
economic growth also leads to faster growth of real wages, and hence enhances 
social stability and the political legitimacy of the socio-economic order.  Thus, 
macroeconomic stabilization and industrial policy interact with each other in a 
virtuous circle of cumulative causation. 
4 Ireland has the highest fertility rate in the EU, and between 1981 and 2001 
experienced a population increase of 15 per cent, from 3.5 million to just over 4 
million in 2004 (NESC 2005: 1).   
5 UNCTAD (2007; 25) notes that monetary or non-monetary resource transfers 
by migrants to their home countries are increasingly recognized as an important 
source of financing for development in Africa, being the second largest source 
of development capital flows to developing countries.  
6 Quite why the Irish economy prospered at this time when the state pursued a 
very restrictive fiscal policy has been the subject of much debate. The European 
Commission saw it as an ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’ which led to 
improved confidence and greater consumption and investments (EC 
Commission 1991; McAleese 1990). Others have stressed the Lawson boom in 
Britain which raised demand for Irish products and fall of the oil-prices; ‘Irish 
policy makers were just lucky that their adjustment was carried out at a time 
when world growth became buoyant and world interest rates were falling’ 
(Bradley et al. 1993). Kennedy (2001: 131-2) also suggests that growth in the 
US economy and the advent of the Single Market after 1993 were important 
factors. 
 
30 
 
 
7 MITI (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) in Japan may have 
played a similar consensus-building role after the Second World War through to 
the 1980s (see Bailey and Sugden, 2007). 
8 The pattern applied in the PNR was followed in successive pacts. An NESC 
report evaluates past experience and lessons, and provides a focal point for 
negotiations. Social pacts provide a mechanism for monitoring implementation 
and evaluation of the programmes. The Central Review Committee (CRC) was 
established in the PNR for this purpose, and includes representatives of the 
Government and the social partners. The CRC is supplemented by working 
groups as well as informal contacts between government and the social partners. 
Successive social pacts have broadened stakeholders involved in the negotiation 
as well as the focus of agreements. 
9 See Bailey and Cowling (2007) who note that industrial policy in the US and 
Japan has involved both vertical measures in targeting new technologies and 
emerging industries, and horizontal measures to support all industries, 
suggesting that the current focus in Britain and the EU with the horizontal 
aspects of industrial policy has been largely misplaced. 
10 For a discussion of the concepts and estimation of deadweight and 
displacement, in the context of Ireland, see Lenihan (1999 and 2004) and 
Lenihan and Hart (2004). 
11 In writing this section we have borrowed passages from Singh (1999) and 
Singh and Weiss (1999). 
12 Even as far back as 1989, there were 307 US companies located in Ireland.  
Ten years later  in 1999, the number of US companies located in Ireland still 
stood at 288.  Whereas, the most recent year for which data is available (2006) 
shows that the total number of US companies has increased to 470 (with these 
470 companies employing 95,515 people).  In fact, in 2001, the number of US 
companies reached a peak at 531.  This information is derived from the 
combined sources of UNCTAD WID (2005) Country Profile Ireland and 
various Annual Report from IDA Ireland (various years).   
13On the development of stock markets and banks in Africa, see further Singh 
(1999b) and Singh (forthcoming) 
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